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By Damian E M Milton 
Introduction 
 “,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ W  ?ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ WƐǇĐŚŝĂƚƌŝĐ ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ĂƵƚŝƐŵ ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝƐ ŝƐ ŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŽ ďĞ
ŝŵƉƌĞĐŝƐĞ ?dŚĂƚ ?ƐƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĂƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ? ? ?hŶĨŽƌƚƵŶĂƚĞůǇ ?/ĚŽŶ ƚƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞůĂƚĞƐƚĞĨĨŽƌƚ ? the DSM-
5  ?  is going to be much help in clearing up the confusion ? ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƐŽŵĞ ǁĂǇƐ ? ŝƚ ?Ɛ ŽŶůǇ ŐŽŝŶŐ ƚŽ
ĐŽŵƉůŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?Grandin, 2013). 
In recent months there has been much furore concerning the publication of the latest version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V, 2013), published by the American 
Psychiatric Association. The latest edition of this manual, which aims to provide criteria by which 
ŵĞŶƚĂůĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌŝƐĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚ ?ŚĂƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽŚŽǁƚŚĞ ?ĂƵƚŝƐŵƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ?ŝƐŶŽǁ
to be defined. The terms Asperger Syndrome and PDD-NOS have been dropped to be replaced by 
ƵƚŝƐŵ ^ƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ  ?^ ? ĂŶĚ ^ŽĐŝĂů ŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐŽƌĚĞƌ  ?ƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůůǇ  ?ĂƵƚŝƐŵ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ƚŚĞĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚ ?ƌĞƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĞŶĞǁĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽ ŽĨ^ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐŚĂve 
been subsumed within the category of social communication, whilst sensory processing differences 
have appeared, but have been subsumed within the category of repetitive and restrictive 
ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌƐ ?ŝĂŐŶŽƐŝƐǁŝůůĂůƐŽďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ ?ƐĞǀĞƌŝƚǇ ? ? 
So, ǁŚǇǁŽƵůĚĂŶĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĂĐƚŝǀŝƐƚ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐŵĞďĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚŝƐĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇ ?hŶůŝŬĞ
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? / ĚŽ ŶŽƚ ĨĞĞů ƌŽďďĞĚ ŽĨ ƐŽŵĞ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŽƌ ŽĨ ǁŚŽ  ?/ ? Ăŵ ? / ŚĂǀĞ ŶĞǀĞƌ ďĞĞŶ Ă
champion of the functional deficit model of autism (or its being applied to neurodiversity more 
widely) espoused by the DSM, or for that matter the International Statistical Classification of Mental 
and Behavioural Disorders (ICD-10, 1992 ? ? ƚŚĞ ĚŝĂŐŶŽƐƚŝĐ ƚŽŽů ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ ƵƐĞĚ ƚŽ ĐůĂƐƐŝĨǇ  ?ŵĞ ? ĂƐ
 ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐƐƉĞƌŐĞƌ^ǇŶĚƌŽŵĞ ? ?The reason I care is due to how these changes will affect how others 
ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ  ?ŵĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ǁŚŽ ĂƌĞ ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ? ĂŶĚ ǁŚĂƚ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ŵĂǇ ďĞ ĚĞĞŵĞĚ
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ? ůƐŽ ? ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ĂĚŝĂŐŶŽƐŝƐ ŝƐ Ă ƐŽĐŝĂů ƚŽŽů ?ĂƉŝĞĐĞŽĨ  ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?  ?Bourdieu, 1986), a 
 ?ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇŽĨƐĞůĨ ? ?Foucault, 1972, 1973 ? ?ƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚďǇďŽƚŚƉƐǇĐŚŝĂƚƌŝƐƚĂŶĚ ?ƉĂƚŝĞŶƚ ? ?dŚƵƐ ?
a change in the way autism is defined is as the Sociologist C. Wright Mills (1959) would have said: a 
ƉƵďůŝĐŝƐƐƵĞĂŶĚŶŽƚũƵƐƚĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛpersonal problem. 
Moving the goalposts: DSM and its critics 
The initial DSM was published in 1952 and evolved out of a number of systems for collecting data, 
from psychiatric hospital statistics, and a manual produced for the US Army. The first two editions 
listed far fewer ailments than later editions and included some references to psychoanalytic ideas as 
well as behaviourist interpretations. Following critiques from radical psychiatrists such as R.D. Laing, 
Thomas Szasz, and David Cooper (names that still automatically get many a psychiatrist into some 
ŬŝŶĚŽĨ ?ĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŵŽĚĞ ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚůĞĚŽŶĨƌ ŵƚŚĞƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚďǇĂǀŝĚ
Rosenhan (1973) which undermined the validity of psychiatric assessments, the DSM-III was released 
in 1980. This edition sought to standardise diagnostic criteria upon the best available evidence, yet 
ŚĂƐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ Ă ĐŽŶƚƌŽǀĞƌƐŝĂů ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ĞǀĞƌ ƐŝŶĐĞ ? &Žƌ ŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ  ?^ĞǆƵĂů KƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞ ?
was not removed until 1987 and the DSM-III-R publication. 
As recently argued by Insel (2013) of the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in the US in 
criticism of the new DSM-V, categorisations within it are generally made by looking at clusters of 
symptoms/behaviours, rather than underlying causation: 
 “tŚŝůĞ^DŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ “ŝďůĞ ?ĨŽƌƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ?ŝƚŝƐ ?ĂƚďĞƐƚ ?ĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ?ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂƐĞƚŽĨ
ůĂďĞůƐĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐĞĂĐŚ ? ? 
Yet, for conditions that have multiple interweaving developmental variables affecting how biological 
factors manifest themselves in lived experience, if a biological basis cannot be found, what then? 
Insel (2013) is right to point out the lack of validity in categorisations made of the basis of symptoms; 
ǇĞƚǁŚĞŶĚŽĞƐĂďƌĂŝŶ ?ŵŝŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞ  ?ďŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚ ? ?dŚŝƐǁŝůůĂůǁĂǇƐďĞƐŽĐŝĂůůǇ situated 
and interpreted. Unlike Insel (2013) ?/ĚŽŶŽƚĐŽŶƚĞŶĚƚŚĂƚĂŶ ?ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝǀĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚ ?ƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇŽĨ
mind (the idea that the mind/consciousness will be explained by scientific investigation) is fully 
possible. Yet indications can be made to correlate subjective data with findings regarding neurology, 
ďƵƚƚŚŝƐǁŝůůŶĞĞĚǀĂƌǇŝŶŐƐƵďũĞĐƚĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƐĂŶĚ ?ƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ƚŽǁŽƌŬƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐƌĂƌĞůǇ
done at present. 
Some psychiatrists of a more radical tradition argue that rather than maintaining a categorical 
system for defining mental distress, what is needed is a dimensional or complaint-based approach 
(Bentall, 2004; Cooper, 2004; Krueger et al. 2005; Timini et al. 2011). A recent report from the 
Division of Clinical Psychologists of the British Psychological Society (BPS, 2013) suggests that current 
systems of categorisation do not take into account to what extent a disorder is produced due to 
internal biological factors, and how much is due to psychological responses to environmental 
conditions. An issue that remains for these critics however, is to answer the question: if one 
removes the label, how would one decide who should have access to support services and on what 
basis? 
The DSM and autistic self-identity 
Even when looking at autism ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ  ?ŝŶƐŝĚĞ-ŽƵƚ ?  ?Grandin, 2013; Williams, 1996), defining what 
ĂƵƚŝƐŵ ?ŝƐ ? ?ŝƐŶŽƐŝŵƉůĞƚĂƐŬ ?ǁŝƚŚƐŽŵĞĂƌŐƵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚĚĞĨŝĐŝƚƐŝŶƐŽĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
are central to the autistic difference, with the primary research priority being neurobiological 
(Grandin, 2013), and others arguing that differences in cognition lead to differences in sociality, 
interactions, and shared understandings with others (Lawson, 2008, 2010; Murray et al. 2005; 
Milton 2012a; Milton 2012b). The former argument would have more in common with /ŶƐĞů ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
criticisms, whilst the latter would share with the BPS (2013) the pressing need to take into account 
biological, psychological, and social factors and how such factors intersect in the lives of people 
within changing contexts. 
Whatever the cognitive difference is, one also has to think  W different to what exactly? The DSM, as 
with much psychological and psychiatric theory, is based on notions of deviance from a measured 
normative state of affairs. Whilst idealising functional normative efficiency may be needed when 
looking at engineering for example, it can leave a lot to be desired when applied as a way of thinking 
to the subjective lived experiences of human beings (Bentall, 2004). Whilst some may feel that 
acquiring a diagnosis of autism has helped to explain their difficulties in life, for me they have helped 
ƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶŚŽǁĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŽƚŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞ ƚŽ ƐĞĞƉĞŽƉůĞ  ?ůŝŬĞŵĞ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŬŝŶĚŽĨƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝƐŝŶŐ
 ?ŐĂǌĞ ? ?dŚĂŶŬĨƵůůǇ / ?Ě ƐĂǇ ? / ?ĚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůůǇďƵŝůƚƵƉŵǇŽwn theories of dispositional diversity and an 
ĂůƌĞĂĚǇ ?ŽƚŚĞƌĞĚ ?ƐĞůĨ-identity before ever coming across such descriptions of the autistic difference. 
Thus, although I found diagnosis useful in many ways, I did not internalise its meanings as defining 
ǁŚŽ ?/ ?Ăŵ ? 
Many years ago, the social theorist George Herbert Mead (1934) distinguished between the socially 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ  ?ŵĞ ?  ?ŚŽǁ ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ƐĞĞ ŵĞ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇ ?ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ ƐŽĐŝĂůůǇ ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ?  ?/ ?  ?ŚŽǁ / ƐĞĞ
myself). Later, psychologists like Erikson (1975) argued that a disjuncture between the two led to 
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƚĂŐĞƐŽĨ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?ĂƐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŵŽǀĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞůŝĨĞƐƉĂŶ ?^ŽŵĞǁŚĂƚĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ
this, Goffman (1963) ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ Ă ŐĂƉ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŵĞ ĂƐ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ? ĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŵĞ ĂƐ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ ?ůĞĚƚo social stigma. Becker (1963) also suggested that negative associations attached to 
ůĂďĞůƐĐĂŶďĞĐŽŵĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝƐĞĚŝŶƚŽŚŽǁƉĞŽƉůĞƐĞĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶĂ ?ƐĞůĨ-ĨƵůĨŝůůŝŶŐƉƌŽƉŚĞĐǇ ? ?dŚƵƐ ?
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ?ĚŝƐŽƌĚĞƌĞĚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚďǇƉƐǇĐŚŝĂƚƌŝƐƚƐleads (in my view), to occupying 
a self-ĚĞĨĞĂƚŝŶŐ ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? zĞƚ ? ƌĞĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ  ?/ ? ĨƌŽŵ ƐƵĐŚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ǁŝůů ďĞ  ?ƐǁŝŵŵŝŶŐ
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞƚŝĚĞ ?ŽĨƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůŐƌŽƵƉƐĂŶĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƚŚĂƚŵĂǇƐƚŝŐŵĂƚŝƐĞǇŽƵĨŽƌŝƚ ? 
For me, identity, as Edley (cited in Hollway, 2007 ?ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ?ŝƐůŝŬĞĂ ?ũĞůůǇƚŚĂƚŶĞǀĞƌƐĞƚƐ ? ? zĞƐ ŵǇ ?/ ?
ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐĂƐďĞŝŶŐ ?ĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?/ ?ƐŚĂƌĞƐĂĐŽŵŵŽŶƐŽĐŝĂů ůĂďĞůǁŝƚŚŵĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ĂŶĚ
within the wider autistic community I have felt camaraderie and recognition. I have also come across 
great differences in terms of how people define themselves with regard to such labels. So, will the 
removal of Asperger Syndrome from the DSM alter the cultural map? Yes, already it has caused quite 
a stir. Will it remove the term completely from the cultural lexicon? I very much doubt it. Perhaps 
ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ?ŵĞŵĞǁŝůů ũƵƐƚ ƚĂŬĞŽŶĂ ƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌŝŶŐŐƵŝƐĞ ?ĂƐ ŝŶ  ?ŚŝŐŚ-ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐĂƵƚŝƐŵ ? ?Žƌ  ?ŵŝůĚ
ĂƵƚŝƐŵ ? ?ďŽƚŚĞƋƵĂůůǇƉŽŽƌĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŽƌƐƚŽŽ ? ?ůƐŽ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŵŽǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐƉĞƌŐĞƌ ?ďĞŝŶŐĂŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
ƐƵƌŶĂŵĞ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƐŚŽƵůĚƉůĞĂƐĞƐŽŵĞĂƵƚŝƐƚŝĐĨĞŵŝŶŝƐƚƐ ?ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ/
have met quite a few. 
As we move forward in these debates, it is nigh-on impossible to accurately predict how these 
changes will impact in a cultural sense, yet I for one am pleased to see academics in the field move 
beyond the classification systems of yesteryear. This should hopefully lead to more interesting and 
informative research. Yet a question we should all be asking is: what is needed in terms of clinical 
practice? Diagnosis of autism at present is clearly flawed, but post-diagnostic support is often even 
more so. Many people are dependent on such definitions to identify with, to access support and 
services (however ill-equipped). When so few people diagnosed as autistic have secure employment, 
housing, educational opportunities and so forth, a removal of the system altogether would cause 
even greater harm if there was not something better to replace it. In order for such a system to 
ĐŽŵĞ ƚŽ ĨƌƵŝƚŝŽŶ ? ŝƚ ǁŝůů ŶĞĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ĂŶĚ ƉƌĂĐƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ  ?ƐŝůŽ ?Ɛ ?  ?Arnold, 2010) to start to 
communicate and work with one another, and that includes autistic people themselves!  
 
